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Case No. 20150284-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff!Appellee,
V.

ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, both third degree felonies. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
The stop. While exiting the freeway on a four-lane ramp into Salt Lake
City, Defendant properly signaled before moving from the second lane to
the third lane. But immediately after entering the third lane, Defendant
moved into the fourth lane. A Salt Lake City police officer who was following Defendant stopped him for violating Utah Code section 41-6a-804,
which requires motorists to signal "continuously for at least the last two
seconds preceding the begitming of the movement," i.e., the lane change.

Impounding the car. After making the stop, the officer learned that the
car was not registered to Defendant and that Defendant's driver's license
had been denied. Because Defendant did not have a valid driver's license,
the officer decided to impound the car. After Defendant exited the car, the
officer permitted him to make a telephone call for somebody to pick up the
car. The officer also asked whether Defendant had any drugs or weapons.
Defendant admitted to having a pair of brass knuckles. The officer seized
the brass knuckles and arrested Defendant for possession of a dangerous
weapon. Pursuant to department policy, the officer inventoried the car in
preparation for its impound. That inventory uncovered a variety of illegal
drugs and paraphernalia. After the officer had inventoried the car and just
as it was being hooked up to the tow truck, the registered owner arrived to
pick up his car. But because the car was well into the impound process, the
officer refused to let the owner take possession at that point.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the officer have reasonable suspicion that Defendant violated
Utah Code section 41-6a-804, requiring motorists to signal "continuously for
at least the last two seconds preceding the beghming" of a change in lanes?
2. Did the officer violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when
he impounded the automobile Defendant was driving when stopped?
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Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress alleging a Fourth Amendment violation is a mixed question of law and fact.
The court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error; its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including its application of the legal
standard to the facts. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ,Il7, 332 P.3d 937.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const. amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804
(West Supp. 2015). 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary of facts.
While exiting Interstate 15 on the four-lane ramp to the 1300 South
Street or 900 South Street exits in Salt Lake City, Officer Jeremy Crowther
saw a vehicle in front of him - driven by Defendant- move from the second
lane to the fourth, or far right, lane. R141-42 (R65-66:if2). Defendant properly signaled before moving from the second lane to the third lane, but then
"in one continuous movement" Defendant "just went across all the traffic"

1

Although the traffic stop at issue was in April 2013, the State cites
section 41-6a-804 as amended in 2015. That amendment did not change the
elements of the offense, but reduced the degree of the offense to an infraction. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(5) (West Supp. 2015).
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into the fourth lane-" without leaving [his vehicle in the third lane for] the
appropriate two second signal." R142,153 (R65-66:12). Officer Crowther activated the emergency lights in his unmarked patrol car and Defendant
pulled off to the side of the road after turning right (east) onto 900 South
Street. R142-44,148 (R66:12).
Officer Crowther approached Defendant, explained why he stopped
him, and requested his driver's license and registration. R145,156. Defendant produced the· car's registration, which was in someone else's name, and
Defendant advised Officer Crowther that it was not his car. R146,154. Defendant did not have a driver's license in his possession. Rl 45-46. Officer
Crowther asked if he had a valid license and Defendant told him that he
did. R146. But when the officer requested Defendant's name and date of
birth, and said that he was going to do a license check, Defendant admitted
to Officer Crowther that his license might be suspended. Rl 46.
Officer Crowther returned to his patrol car and ran a computer check
on Defendant's driver's license, the vehicle registration, and Defendant's
criminal background. R146-47. The driver's license check revealed that Defendant's license had in fact been denied. R146 (R66:13). The registration
check showed that the vehicle he was driving was registered to someone
other than Defendant. R146. And the criminal background check revealed
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that Defendant was" a documented gang member" and drug user. R147,156.
In fact, ·officer Crowther had himself arrested Defendant several months before the stop on an unrelated drug charge. R147 (R66:13). After gathering
this information, Officer Crowther decided to impound the vehicle because
Defendant did not have a valid driver's license. R147,158 (R66:14).
Officer Crowther, together with a second officer who had arrived as
backup, notified Defendant that his license had been denied and that they
were going to impound the vehicle. R148-49. Upon being so advised, Defendant told Officer Crowther that the car belonged to his brother and asked

if he could call him to come pick it up. R149,153-55 (R66:17). Officer
Crowther permitted him·to do so, but only after he exited the car. R149,151. ·
Concerned for his safety based on Defendant's gang affiliation, Officer
Crowther asked Defendant if he "had anything illegal, weapons or anything
on his person." R149,156 (R66:15). Defendant admitted that he had a pair of
brass knuckles in his pocket and consented to a search of his person.

R149,157 (R66:,I5). Officer Crowther retrieved the brass knuckles and arrested Defendant for carrying a concealed weapon. R149-50 (R66:i15).
After placing Defendant in his pah·ol car, Officer Crowther inventoried the vehicle Defendant had been driving in preparation for impound.

R150 (R66:'if6). Consistent with the department's impound policy, SE2 (Ad-
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dendum C), Officer Crowther documented the property found in the car using the department's impound forms. RlS0-51. The inventory uncovered
methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and a glass pipe used to smoke narcotics. R152 (R66:1q). The registered owner of the car-presumably Defendant's brother- arrived to pick up the car after the inventory was completed,
just as the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow truck. R151-52 (R66:if7).
Because the car was already in the process of being towed, Officer Crowther
proceeded with the impound. R152 (R66:if7).
B. Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with (1) unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a second degree felony; (2) unlawful possession of heroin, a second
degree felony; (3) unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a class A misdemeanor;-(4) unlawful possession of marijuana, a
class A misdemeanor; and (5) unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor. Rl-3. Following a preliminary hearing and bindover
order, R24-25, R106-37 (transcript), Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person and from the car he was driving. R35-46. The
State filed an opposing memorandum. R47-54. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the motion, R59-60,138-72, and entered corresponding findings of fact and conclusions of law, R65-68.
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Defendant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession
of methamphetamine and heroin, both third degree felonies, reserving his
right to appeal the court's ruling denying his motion to suppress. R85,87-93.
Defendant was sentenced to suspended prison terms of zero to five years,
placed on supervised probation for 24 months, and ordered to serve 180
days in jail. R85-86. Defendant timely appealed. R75,84.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The justification for the stop. Defendant argues that the traffic stop
was not justified at its inception because Utah Code section 41-6a-804 does
not require that a driver signal for two seconds between each lane change.
He is wrong. Section 41-6a-804, when properly read, requires a two-second
signal before the beginning of a vehicle's movement, i.e., before a vehicle
turns left or right or "change[s] lanes." Accordingly, when the officer saw
Defendant immediately change to the fourth lane after entering the third
lane, he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation that justified the stop.
Even if this Court were to interpret section 41-6a-804 differently, reasonable
suspicion still existed because the officer's interpretation would be a reasonable mistake of law-no appellate court has addressed the issue and the
Department of Public Safety has interpreted section 41-6a-804 in similar
fashion.
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II. The vehicle impound. Defendant argues that the vehicle impound
was not justified under the Fourth Amendment, primarily because the officer did not permit him to make arrangements for the registered owner to
retrieve the vehicle. Although the vehicle impound cannot be justified under state law, it was reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant's driver's license had been denied. He vy-as the only occupant of the car. And he
was not the registered owner. Under these circumstances, impounding the
car served the legitimate caretaking function of protecting ·the owner's
property. Although Defendant was allowed to call the registered owner, the
officer never knew whether or not arrangements had in fact been made.
And he could not be certain that the person contacted was in fact the owner.
Where Defendant was already under arrest, the officer was not required to
wait in the hopes that the owner had been called and was on his way.
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ARGUMENT
. I.

The officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant's
continuous movement across two lanes was a violation of Utah Code section 41-6a-804.
In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that Utah Code section
41-6a-804 requires only that a driver signal for two seconds before initiating
a lane change, but may thereafter move into additional lanes without pausing two seconds in each lane changed. See R37. The trial court rejected that
argument and thus concluded that "Officer Crowther directly observed a
traffic offense and consequently the stop was justified at its inception."
R67:,I1. This Court should affirm.

***
When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the vehicle occupantsboth driver and passengers alike - are seized within the n1eaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). A routine
traffic stop "is a relatively brief encounter" and is thus akin to the investigatory detention described in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). Accordingly, police officers are justified in making
a traffic stop only if they have" 'reasonable suspicion' -that is, 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped' of
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breaking the law." Heien v. North Carolina,_ U.S. _ , 135 S.Ct. 530, 536
(2014).
The question in this case is whether Officer Crowther had reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Defendant violated Utah Cod~ section 41-6a-804
when he signaled for two seconds before changing from the second lane to
the third, but then immediately moved into the fourth lane after entering
the third lane. The answer is yes.
When properly read, section 41-6a-804 requires that a motorist signal
for two seconds before changing into a different lane. Thus, a motorist wishing to move across multiple lanes must signal for two seconds before moving into each lane. Because Defendant moved into the fourth lane immediately after entering the third lane, the facts supported a reasonable suspicion
that Defendant violated section 41-6a-804. But even if this Court were to interpret section 41-6a-804 as only requiring a two-second signal for the first
lane change, reasonable suspicion still supported the stop. This is so because
the officer's reading of section 41-6a-804 as requiring a two-second signal
before each lane change would be, in that case, a reasonable mistake of law.
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A. Section 41-6a-804 requires that a driver signal for two
seconds before moving into a different lane; Defendant's failure to do so thus provided the officer with at
least reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.
Utah Code section 41-6a-804(1) imposes two requirements on drivers
before turning or changing lanes:
(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on
a roadway or change lanes until:
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety;
and
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this section.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change
lanes shall be given continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the movement.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1) (West Supp. 2015). The issue on appeal addresses the second requirement governing the use of signals. The question is
whether section 41-6a-804(1) requires a two-second signal before each lane·
change, or before only the first lane change when crossing over multiple·
lanes. As correctly understood by both the trial court and Officer Crowther,
the statute requires a two-second signal before each lane change.
"'When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary
goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the
statute was meant to achieve."' Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transportation,_
P.3d __, 2016 UT 10, ,Ill (quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT
110, 114, 993 P.2d 875). That is generally done by looking to" 'the plain Ian-
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II

guage of the statute itself'" -not in isolation, but in the relevant context"
of the entire statutory scheme. Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 118,
193 P.3d 92). When so read, section 41-6a-804 requires a two-second signal
before each lane change.
A proper interpretation of section 41-6a-804 first requires an under11

standing of the vehicle movements it governs. There are two: (1) turn[ing]"
II

11

or mov[ing] right or left on a roadway," and (2) chang[ing] lanes." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(a). Thus, like the Texas traffic code at issue in

United States v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2015)-upon which Defendant relies, Aplt.Brf. 17-20-the Utah Traffic Code recognizes "a distinction between the two" movements. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 250. But unlike the Texas statute under review in Alvarado-Zarza, section 41-6a-804 gov- .
II

erns both movements. Accordingly, reference in the statute to movement"
11

refers to the movements of both turn[ing] right or left" and "chang[ing]
lanes." Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-804(1)(b). The focus here is the movement of
changing lanes.
Section 41-6a-804 provides that a driver "may not ... change lanes
until" two requirements are met: (1) "the movement," i.e., the lane change,
can be made with reasonable safety," Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(a)(i);
and (2) "[a] signal of intention ... to change lanes [has been] given continu-
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ously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning of the
movement," i.e., the lane change, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-804(1)(a)(ii) &
(b). By its plain language, therefore, the statute imposes a two-second signal
requirement "preceding the beginning" of any lane change. The Utah Driver Handbook also interprets section 41-6a-804 as requiring a signal

u [

f] or

two seconds before beginning any lane change." Utah Driver Handbook
p.12 (rev. 06-14) (attached to Aplt.Brf., Add. E) (emphasis added).
Here, Defendant did not make a single lane change; he made two
such movements. After signaling for two seconds, he first changed from the
second lane to the third lane. R141-42 (R65-66:if2). Defendant then changed
lanes again. After entering the third lane, he immediately moved into the
fourth lane. -R142,153 (R65-66:if2). Unlike the first lane change, Defendant
did not signal "continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the
beginning of [that] movement." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(b). When
Officer Crowther observed Defendant's movement from the third to the
fourth lane, he not only had reasonable suspicion, but probable cause that
Defendant violated section 41-6a-804(1). See State v. Gettling, 2010 UT 17,

,rs,

229 P.3d 647 ("Observing a vehicle commit a traffic violation gives police
probable cause to detain the driver and passengers of the vehicle.").
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The error in Defendant's interpretation of section 41-6a-804 is his failure to read the statute as a whole. Instead, he attempts to interpret the plain
meaning of "movement" in isolation, without reference to the context in
which the term is used. See Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,r11 (holding that Court
will" 'not interpret the plain meaning of a statutory term in isolation'") (citation omitted). Defendant interprets "movement" as referring only to the
movement away from the lane of travel. Thus, according to Defendant, a
change of multiple lanes in one continuous movement-or in his words, a
"lane change maneuver" -constitutes but a single movement. See Aplt.Brf.
18,21 (arguing that Defendant complied with Utah's lane change law because he initiated a signal prior to starting his lane changes that consisted of
'one continuous movement"'). But as discussed, that is not the way the
statute reads. As relevant here, the term "movement" in section 41-6a-8O4
refers to "chang[ing] lanes." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(b). Therefore,
once Defendant entered the third lane, he was required to signal "continuously for at least the last two seconds before the beginning of the [next]
movement, i.e., before "chang[ing] lanes" again. Id.
The foregoing plain language interpretation of section 41-6a-804 is also consistent with "the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.'" See

Monarrez, 2016 UT 10, ,111. Like all provisions in the Traffic Code, the pur-
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pose of section 41-6a-804 is to ensure highway safety. Indeed, the first requirement before turning or changing lanes is that "the movement can be
made with reasonable safety." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804(1)(a)(ii). The
two-second signal requirement furthers that objective by alerting motorists
in the vicinity that the vehicle will be moving into their lane. A two-second
signal ensures that motorists in that lane, or that motorists who are also
about to enter that lane, are aware of that pending movement and have time
to act accordingly. Nearby motorists would have no such warning if drivers
were permitted to cross multiple lanes immediately after the first lane
change.
In sum, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is consistent with
both the plain language and purpose of the statute. Because Defendant did
not signal continuously for two seconds before changing from the third lane
to the fourth lane, Officer Crowther had at least reasonable suspicion that
Defendant violated section 41-6a-804 and he was thus justified in making
the traffic stop.
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B. Even if section 41-6a-804 does not require that a driver signal for two seconds before each lane change, the
officer's believe otherwise is a reasonable mistake of
law.
Even if this Court were to interpret section 41-6a-804 as not imposing
a two-second signal requirement before any lane change, Officer Crowther' s
interpretation of the statute to read otherwise was a reasonable mistake of
law." And because the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable
suspicion justifying the stop." Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 540.
"[S]earches and seizures based on mistakes of fact [or law] can be reasonable .... The limit is that 'the mistakes must be those of reasonable
men."' Id. at 356 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
In other words, "[t]he Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes,
and those mistakes-whether of fact or of law-must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 539. Should this Court interpret section 41-6a-804' s two-second
signal requirement as applying only to the beginning of the first lane change
in a multiple "lane change maneuver," Officer Crowther's contrary interpretation was, in fact, an" objectively reasonable" mistake of law.
As discussed, section 41-6a-804 is reasonably read as requiring a twosecond signal before making any turn or lane change. This was the interpretation ot the trial court. See R67:ifl. And this is the interpretation of the official Utah Driver Handbook published by the Department of Public Safety.
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See Handbook, p.12 ("Signals are required ... [f]or two seconds before beginning any lane change.") (emphasis added). Under these circumstances, a
contrary holding by this Court could only be the result of an ambiguous
statute. The officer's interpretation of the statute, therefore, was reasonable.
Had this Court or the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the statute otherwise
before now, the officer's alleged misunderstanding of the law would not
have been reasonable. But Utah's appellate courts have not addressed this
question. Accordingly, the officer's interpretation of section 41-6a-804, if
mistaken, was reasonable. See Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d at 250 (observing that
mistake of law in Heien was reasonable where "statute contained at least
some ambiguity" and "the state's appellate courts had not previously addressed the issue"). Because Officer Crowther's mistake of law-if there
were one-" was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion justifying the
stop" in any event. Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 540.

II.

The officer's decision to impound the vehicle Defendant was driving did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant also argued below that Officer Crowther' s inventory of the
car violated the Fourth Amend1nent because (1) impounding the car was
unnecessary where the registered owner was present at the scene, (2) impounding the car was not authorized by statute, and (3) impounding the car
-17-

was a pretext to search for drugs. R43-45. The trial court rejected these arII

guments. It ruled that impound was reasonable where Defendant did not
have a valid driver's license," Defendant "was not the owner," and Defendant "was the only occupant" of the vehicle. R67:,I2. The court also rejected
II

Defendant's pretext claim because Officer Crowther conducted the impound [inventory] pursuant to his department impound policy." R67:if 4.
This Court should affirm.

***
As a general rule, a search requires a warrant based upon a finding of
probable cause. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (holding
that "[w]arrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable"). The warrant
rule, however, is subject to "a few limited exceptions." Id. One such exception is the inventory of lawfully impounded property, such as an automobile. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The inventory of an
automobile serves three purposes: (1) "protecting the owner's property,"
(2) protecting the police against "liability for lost or stolen property," and

(3) "protecting the police and public from danger." State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264,267 (Utah 1985); accord Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.

The inventory exception, therefore, is not grounded in the State's law
enforcement interests. It is grounded in the State's " 'community caretaking
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functions.'" Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433,441 (1973)). As such, "[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are
not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of probable
cause ...." Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). An inventory is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if two requirements are met. First,
police must have "reasonable and proper justification for [impounding] the
vehicle." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268. And second, police must conduct the inventory in substantial compliance with "' an establ~shed reasonable procedure
for safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents.' " Id. at 269 (quoting 2 Lafave, Search & Seizure§ 7.4, at 576-77 (1978)). The only issue on appeal is the first requirement-whether Officer Crowther was justified in impounding the car. 2
As explained in Hygh, impounding a car may be justified

u

either

through explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances surround-·
ing the initial stop." Id. In this case, no specific statutory authority exists authorizing the impound of a vehicle whose driver does not have a valid operator's license. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1101 (West Supp. 2015).

2

Defendant has never claimed that Officer Crowther did not conduct
the inventory in conformance with the Salt Lake City Police Department's
established impound policy. See R35-46; R160-67; Aplt.Brf. 22-37.
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That said, the circumstances surrounding the stop justified the impound
and resulting inventory. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268.
As noted by the· trial court, Defendant did not have a valid driver's
license; he was the only occupant of the vehicle; and he was not the vehicle's owner. R67:12. Thus, whether or not he was under arrest when Officer
Crowther decided to impound the car, Defendant could not lawfully drive it
away from the scene, nor would.he be permitted to do so. Defendant was
also physically incapable of driving the car away once he was arrested- .
which preceded both the inventory and impound. See RlS0 (R66:if5). And
finally, no one was with Defendant who could have driven the car away. See
R145. Officer Crowther thus had two choices: he could leave the car thereparked along the curb of 900 South Street, which sustains traffic from cars
exiting the freeway-or he could impound the vehicle for the absent owner's safekeeping. Under these circumstances, the officer's choice to impound
the car was justified under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnson, 745
P.2d 452 (Utah 1987) (upholding impound where "neither [defendant] nor
his friends could properly have moved the vehicle" from the motel parking
lot). This is especially true where the registered owner was not present. See
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267 (recognizing that impound serves the legitimate pur-

pose of "protecting the owner's property").
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Citing State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 508 (Minn. 2008), Defendant
argues that impound was not justified because "Officer Crowther failed to
allow for an alternative to impound when [he] made it clear that a viable
and immediate one was available." Aplt.Brf. 30. But the Fourth Amendment
does not require an officer to pursue alternatives to impoundment. As noted
by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, the United States Supreme Court in

Colorado v. Bertine "held that although the police could have offered the defendant the opportunity to make other arrangements for· the safekeeping of
his property, their failure to do so did not eliminate the justification for taking an inventory of the defendant's property." Johnson, 745 P.2d at 454. As

Bertine explained, "the police may still wish to protect themselves
... against false claims of theft or dangerous instrumentalities." 479 U.S. at
373. " 'The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not
necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative less intrusive
means.'" Id. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)). It
tu1ns instead on" 'whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps.' " Id.
(quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647 (emphasis in original). Here it did not.
Officer Crowther did in fact allow Defendant to make a telephone call
for his brother to pick up the car. R151. But after Defendant made the call,
Officer Crowther was never made aware of whether Defendant successfully

-21-

made arrangements for the car's retrieval. See R154 (when asked whether he
knew there was an owner willing to take possession of the car, the officer
testified, "I didn't talk to him, sir, so I don't know"). He thus had no idea if
-or when the registered owner would come. He only learned that when the
owner arrived following the inventory. See R151 (testifying that Defendant
"did make a phone call because someone actually showed up").
Additionally, as in Bertine, Defendant here had been arrested and
placed in the patrol car before the vehicle was impounded. R150 (R66:·,r,rs6). Thus, as even Gauster recognized, it may be "necessary to do something
with the vehicle" under such circumstances. 752 N.W.2d at 507 (emphasis in
original). And Gauster agreed that it was not unreasonable for the Supreme
Court in Bertine "to have concluded that in such a case, the police should
not have to take time to determine how the arrestee_ wants to dispose of his
vehicle." Id. This is especially true here. Although Defendant claimed that
his brother owned the car, Officer Crowther had no way of knowing that
was true at the time. And he had reason to doubt Defendant's representation- Defendant had initially lied that he had a valid driver's license, coming clean only after learning that Officer Crowther intended to verify his license status. R146. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable to proceed
with the impound.

-22-

Defendant also argues that the impound was not justified because it
violated the Salt Lake City Police Department's Impound Policy. Aplt.Brf.
32-35. Relying on Tenth Circuit precedent, Defendant contends that to justify a vehicle impound, the police department's impound policy must ✓, delineate the amount ·of discretion ·an officer has when deciding whether to impound a vehicle" and the officer must comply with those procedures.
Aplt.Brf. 32-33 (citing United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir.
2015)). Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, whether a vehicle
impound is justified under the Fourth Amendment does not turn on local
police policies. And even if it did, Officer Crowther did not violate Salt Lake
City's impound policy.
The federal circuits are in fact split as to whether the validity of a vehicle impound depends on the creation of, and compliance with, a police
department's impound policy. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1247-48 (recognizing·
"a clear divide between the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, which never
consider whether an impoundment follows standardized procedures, and
the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits," which do). This Court
should follow the rationale of the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits.
As·noted by the First Circuit, the Supreme Court in Bertine held that
the vehicle impound in that case

II

was reasonable under the Fourth
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Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to standard criteria_ and
· was based on something other than the suspicion of criminal activity." Unit-

ed States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 238 (1st Cir. 2006). But the First Circuit understood Bertine to merely hold that an impound decision "made pursuant
to standardized procedures will most likely, although not necessarily always, satisfy the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 238-39. This Court should read

Bertine likewise. As the United States Supreme Court has more recently emphasized," 'whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment' ... has never 'depend[ed] on the law of the particular
State in which the search occurs.'" Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) ·
(quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). In light of this holding, it would be strange indeed to hold that _the reasonableness of an impound depe;nded on local policy policies.
The

11

'ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-

ness.'" Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v.

Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,403 (2006)). And reasonableness in the inventory setting
is grounded not in a police department's policy manuals, but in the legitimate caretaking interests of "protecting the police and public from danger,
avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's property." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267. The Utah Supreme Court has thus
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held that in determining whether a vehicle impound was justified under the
Fourth Amendment, courts "must look to the circumstances surrounding
the stop to determine whether the impound was reasonable." Id. at 268. This
Court is bound to follow suit.
In any event, Officer Crowther followed department policy in exercising his discretion to impound the car. That policy permits officers to ....,impound vehicles as a means of enforcing local and State Laws, removing a
public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or protecting the vehicle and its

contents until the owner can take possession of it." Impound Policy, p. 1 (Addendum C) (emphasis added). As explained above, the vehicle impound in
this case was reasonable to "protect[] the vehicle and its contents.until the
owner [could] take possession of it." Id.
Defendant points to the policy's ensuing line: "To avoid needless expense and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall use discretion
in determining whether or not a vehicle should be impounded." Id. But this
does not mean that an officer must always eschew hnpound if doing so will
avoid expense and inconvenience. As explained, the car's owner was not
present and Officer Crowther had no assurance he would arrive. It was thus
reasonable for him to impound the car. And by the time the owner did arrive, Officer Crowther had already conducted the inventory.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on April 20, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

ADDENDUM A
Relevant Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
U.S. Const. amend. IV
Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6a-804 (West Supp. 2015)

U.S. Const. amend. IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-804 (West Supp. 2015)

( 1)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move right or left on a roadway or
change lanes until:
(i) the movement can be made with reasonable safety; and
(ii) an appropriate signal has been given as provided under this
section.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall be
given continuously for at least the last two seconds preceding the beginning
of the movement.
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle
without first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately
to the rear when there is opportunity to give a signal.
(3)(a) A stop or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand
and arm or by signal lamps.
(b) If hand and arm signals are used, a person operating a vehicle shall
give the required hand and arm signals from the left side of the vehicle as
follows:
(i) left turn: hand and arm extended horizontally;
(ii) right turn: hand and arm extended upward; and
(iii) stop or decrease speed: hand and arm extended downward.
(c)(i) A person operating a bicycle or device propelled by human power
may give the required hand and arm signals for a right turn by extending the
right hand and arm horizontally to the right.
(ii) This Subsection (3 )( c) is an exception to the provision of
Subsection (3)(b)(ii).
(4) A person required to make a signal under this section may not flash a
signal:
(a) on one side only on a disabled vehicle;
(b) as a courtesy or "do pass" to operators of other vehicles approaching
from the rear; or
(c) on one side only of a parked vehicle.
(5) A violation of this section is an infraction.

ADDENDUMB
Find ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R65-68)

SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
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Deputy District Attorney
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDING OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs-

Case No. 131904665 FS
ROMEO LUCERO OLIVAREZ,
Hon. Randall N. Skanchy
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion To Supress having been raised in Court in the above entitled matter
on December 9, 2013. The Court considered memoranda submitted by the Defense and the State
as well as testimony and evidence adduced at the motion hearing. The Defendant was
represented by counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, and the State was represented by Deputy District
Attorney, Byron F. Burmester. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
I.

Defendant, Romeo Lucero Olivarez was charged with three counts of possession
of controlled substances, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person and possession of drug paraphernalia arising out of a traffic stop on
April 30, 2013.

2.

On April 30, 2013 Officer Crowther observed a vehicle coming off the 900 South
exit onto West Temple turn on its right turn signal but change multiple lanes
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 131904665
Page2
without pausing 2 seconds for each lane change. When the vehicle tu.med east
on 900 South the officer made a traffic stop.

3.

After contactin~ the Defendant who was the lone occupant of the vehicle, Officer
Crowther discovered the Defendant's drivers license was denied. Officer
Crowther further realized that the Defendant was a known gang member and
that he had arrested him recently on unrelated drug charges.

4.

Officer Crowther decided at that point he would impound the vehicle. He
informed the Defendant and asked the Defendant to get out of the vehicle that
was registered to someone else.

5.

Officer Crowther asked the Defendant if he had any weapons or contraband on
him, to which the Defendant replied that he had brass knuckles. Officer
Crowther seized the brass knuckles and then arrested the defendant.

6.

Pursuant to Salt Lake City Police Department policy Officer Crowther began an
impound inventory of the vehicle. During the inventory officer Crowther found
methamphetamine, heroin, and a pipe for ingesting controlled substances.

7.

At some point after the officer had informed the Defendant that he was going to
impound the vehicle, the Defendant requested that he be permitted to call the
owner to retrieve the vehicle. Someone arrived purporting to be the owner after
the inventory was complete and the vehicle was being hooked up to the tow
truck. The officer declined to turn the vehicle over and completed the impound
process.

8.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
~I
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1.

Officer Crowther directly observed a traffic offense and consequently the stop
was justified at its inception. Further, the officer's questioning of the defendant
did not exceed the scope of the purpose of the stop.

2.

Once the vehicle stopped the officer determined that the driver did not have a
valid license; that he was the only occupant; and that the driver was not the
owner. Thus the officer's decision to impound the vehicle did not exceed the
scope of the purpose of the stop.

3.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defudant's criminal
history, gang affiliation, and admission of possessing a dangerous weapon, the
officer had a reasonable belief in his concern for his safety.

4.

Officer Crowther conducted the impound pursuant to his department impound
policy.

5.

Therefore the State has satisfied its burden that the seizure and subsequent
impound were reasonable and the evidence obtained is the not the fruit of the
poisonous tree.

6.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is denied.

DATED this IO th day o f ~ 201!J_.
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READ AND APPROVED AS TO FORM:

~/
Counsel for Romeo Lucero Olivarez .

00068

,Q

ADDENDUMC
Salt Lake City Police Department Impound Policy
(State's Exhibit 2)

•

•
•

111-400 IMPOUNDS, VEHICLE HOLDS AND
RELOCATIONS

Officers of this Department may impound vehicles as
a means of enforcing local and State Laws, removing
a public hazard or nuisance, securing evidence, or
protecting the vehicle and its contents until the owner
can take possession of it. To avoid needless expense
and inconvenience to the vehicle owner, officers shall
use discretion in determining whether or not a vehicle
should be impounded.
All impounds will be documented in the RMS and on
a Salt Lake City Police Department Impound Report.
The impounding otliccr will provide the tow driver
the white and pink copies and submit the yellow copy
10 Records.

•

State Impounds will be documented on the TC540/Utah State Tax Commission Vehicle Impound
Report The impounding officer will provide the tow
driver the yellow copy and submit the white and
goldenrod copies to Records, who will forward the
form to the Impound Coordinator in Auto Thell The
Impound Coordinator will send the Impound forms
by mail lo the Motor Vehicle Division. The pink
copy has vehicle release information on the reverse
side and will be left with the driver. The Division of
Motor Vehicles must be notified within 48 hours of
impound.
An impound report form will be completed for every
vehicle impounded for any reason.
Notice of lmpoundment

SLCPD will provide the vehicle owner a Notice of
lmpoundment and Right to Impound Hearing form
within 48 hours of a city impoundment. This form
should not be used with State tax impounds.
The officer will fill in the name of the vehicle owner
or driver from the information obtained by valid
identification, if available The most current address
shoLild be obtained.

•

The officer will date and sign the form and deliver
the original lo the vehicle owner or driver at the time
of impound. The copy ufthc Notice oflmpoundment
and Right to Impound Hearing form should be turned
into Records who will forward it to the Impound
Coordinator in Auto Thell.
The Impound
Coordinator will send notification by certified mai l to

the registered owner and lien holder within 5 working
days of irnpoundment whether or not the vehicle is
being held for evidence.
The initial officer should deliver the original copy of
the Notice of lmpoundment form to the vehicle's
registered owner or driver during the course of the
investigation. If the vehicle's owner or driver has left
the scene prior to impound, the original should be (ell
in a visible and safe place in the vehicle's driver
compartment. The officer should write "Unavailable
to Sign" in the "Del iver To" area. The copy should
then be forwarded as above.
State Impounds for Expired Registration

The following procedure will govern the impounding
of vehicles for expired registration only situations.
Occupied Vehicles: In cases where a vehicle
displaying expired registration is accompanied by the
owner or a responsible party or if the owner can be
contacted, and that person verifies the registration is
in fact expired, the following nppl ics:
•

If the expiration date is less than 90 days, do not
impound.
If the expiration date is 90 days or more and
verification can be obtained as stated above, a
Stale Impound may be in order. Officers may
exercise discretion on the side of not impounding
as the facts ofU1e situation dictate.

Revoked Registration: For various reasons the
OMV can revoke Lhe registration of a vehicles.
When the registration ha~ been revoked, the vehicle
can be impounded, holding for tl1c vehicle for State
Tax.
Unoccupied Vehicles: Unoccupied vehicles will not
be impounded for expired registration relying solely
upon the information provided from the State
Computer System. This policy docs not preclude the
enforcement of any City Ordinances npplicablc,
including abandoned vehicles or streets for storage.
" No lnsurnnce": vehicles will not be impounded for
the reason of'"No Insurance," "No Insurance" can be
added to the citation as a secondary to the primary
reason for impound.
Authority of Parking Enforcement Personnel

Parking enforcement personnel arc authorized to
impound vehicles that arc parked in violation of City

Ordinances and State Laws. Upon request, an officer
of this Department will respond and provide
assistance as needed.
Appropriate reports and
documentation will be entered into the RMS by
Parking Enforcement and maintained hy this
Departmenl

•

Jmpound Fee Waiver

If fees are to be waived, the follow-up Detective will
go to the Service Desk, obtain the waiver f~rm a~d
fill it out completely. The follow-up detective will
have the Division/Unit Commander, Assistant
Division/Unit Commander or Watch Commander
approve and initial the form. The follow-up detective
will call the Hearing Office at 801-535-6321 and
notify them that a fax is enroute. The follow-up
detective will then fax the fonn lo the Hearing Office
at 801-535-6082.
The Hearing Officer will review the form and will
either give approval or denial then fax the fonn back
to the Police Department at the number provided by
the follow-up detective. The follow-up detective will
then return the form to the Service Desk. The citizen
will be given a copy to take to the impound lot for
release of the vehicle. If the recommendation is to
deny the fee waiver, the person requesting the waiver
should be referred to the Hearing Officer.

Wrecker Use
The officer must detennine the appropriate type of
impound, City or State and fill out the appropriate
impound form.
Only those towing companies
specified by contractual agreement with the City will
be used to tow impounded vehicles on non-state
impounds. There is only one City Impound lot.
There are several State-impound lots used to store
impounded vehicles. The reporting officer m~st !ist
the Towing Company, phone number and destination
in the Vehicle Field on the Impound Report form and
is to be included in the Scizcdffowed details page of
the RMS.
Holds on Impounded Vehicles
At the time of impound, the officer must notify
Dispatch of any holds on the impounded vehicle.
Holds will be documented in the Seized/Towed
details page. Police personnel will refer to this
information when a vehicle owner or the owner's
representative inquires about release of the vehicle.

Hold for Owner: The vehicle may be released to
the owner or the owner's representative.
Hold for State: Release of the vehicle must be
obtained through the State Division of Motor
Vehicles.
Hold: Recovered Stolen: Is either a hold for
Detectives or hold for Owner.
Hold for Evidence: The vehicle can only be
released upon authorization of the investigating
division or the District Attorney's Oflice.

If a car is impounded as a recovered stolen vehicle,
the car shall be removed to the City Impound Lot and
"Hold for Owner". Should the vehicle be improperly
registered, evidence in another case, ownership in
dispute, etc., a hold should be placed for the followup squad. (Any vehicle which would have been
released to the owner at the scene can be "Hold for
Owner", when impounded. When a vehicle is
impoundc..-d with a hold for evidence, the hold will
expire seven days from the date of impoundment.
The Impound Coordinator will send the follow-up
Detective an Impound request for approval to release.
If circumstances require the hold to be extended past
the seven-day period, follow-up investigators must
submit the written request through their
Division/Unit Commander advising the Impound
Coordinator of the extension.
The Impound
Coordinator will update the computer entry on the
Seized/rowed details pages indicating the extension
of the hold. After the extended day has expired, the
Impound Coordinator will send a second request for
approval to relea'>e. The follow-up Detective will
remove the extended hold as soon as possible.
Vehicle Inventory
A thorough inventory search will be made of all

vehicles being impounded A thorough inventory
search will include:
•

The interior of the vehicle, including under the
seats, the glove box, etc.
• Under the hood.
• The trunk, when possible.
o
All closed containers, i.e, sacks, hags, boxes,
etc.
The officer will remove all valuables from the
vehicle and place them in evidence for safekeeping.
Closed or locked briefcases, luggage, etc., will be
opened before being placed in evidence. Such items
will be opened in the presence of a supervisor if the
locks must be forced or other damage done in order

to open them. It is recommended the vehicle's owner
or the driver be present.
All items not considered valuables, such as spare
tires, old clothing, etc .• will be locked in the vehicle's
trunk, if possible.

Authorized Access
Access lo impounded vehicles stored in the City
impound lot is limited to:
•

The officer will include the following in the property
report:
o

•

•

Valuables placed into evidence.
Valuable items left in the vehicle because of the
difficulty of transporting them to evidence (large
machinery, etc.) will be listed in the report's
details.
If no valuables are found in the vehicle, the
officer will note that information in the report's
narrative.

•
•

•

Releasing Vehicles to Incompetent Drivers

•

If a vehicle owner requests release of an impounded
vehicle and appears lo be intoxicated or othc.-wisc
incapable of operating the vehicle safely,
Service/Impound Desk personnel may request that an
officer be dispatched to the desk. The assigned
officer will evaluate the owner's condition and take
appropriate action.

•

If the owner proves to be intoxicated or unable to
operate a vehicle safely, the vehicle will not be
released. If the owner is incapacitated, but requests
that the vehicle be released to another person, and the
officer is satislied that the other person could legally
operate the vehicle, the officer may authorize release
of the vehicle.

•

•
Access to the City Impound Lot
No one will be allowed access to the impound lot
without complying with procedures outlined in this
policy. Impound lots under State control are not
governed
by
this
policy.
o

o

Salt Lake City police officers, officers of the
DEA Metro, and officers from outside agencies
including
Motor
Vehicle
Enforcement
Investigator.
The vehicle owner or the owner's representative.
The vehicle owner is verified by the State
Vehicle Registration which has been attached to
the case by the first individual to run the
registration.
The owner's representative must have a
notarized letter from the registered owner.
Verification of release will be by verifying with
State issued driver's license, State issued ID or
passport against the registration or notarized
letter.
All fees need to be paid prior to releasing any
vehicle.
Insurance Adjusters: The Insurance Adjuster's
identification will be verified by State issued
driver's license, State issued lD or passport
along with a business card from the insurance
company with their name on the card. If the
Insurance Adjuster is requesting release of the
vehicle all lees need to be paid.
Any other person authorized by court order: A
court order will be verified by State issued
driver's license, State issued ID or passport. If
the court order states that fees are to be paid they
need to be paid prior to releasing. If the court
order indicates that the individual is not
responsible for the fees, a waiver needs to be
initiated by the follow-up Detective,
Leasing Companies: The representative of the
leasing company must submit a letter on
Company letter head verifying that he/she is on
employee of that leasing company and is
authorized to obtain the release for that vehicle.
All fees arc required to be paid prior to releasing
the vehicle.
Dealers: The dealer must show evidence of
ownership along with proof that they represent
that dealership. The dealer must also present the
dealer plate to the Impound Yard when
transporting the vehicle from the Impound lot to
the dealership unless towed or transported on a
flatbed. All appropriate fees must be paid prior
to giving a release.
Registered Lien holders or their representatives:
The lien holder must provide a copy of the title
that shows the lien and proves that the lien

o

•

•

release section has not been signed. State issued
driver's license, State ID or a passport is required
to verify identification. If a release is to be given
to the representative, they need to have a letter
on company letterhead with the individual's
name listed in the letter authorizing them to take
possession of the vehicle.
Towing Companies: lfthc insurance company is
releasing to a tow company, a copy of the work
order with the insurance company's information
and name of the individual picking up the
vehicle, along with the individual's driver's
license, State ID or passport must be submilled
at the time of request.
If an individual is authorizing n tow company to
take possession of their vehicle, a notarized leuer
stating the tow company's name needs to be
submitted at the time of request to release the
vehicle, along with the tow company's driver'sdriver's license, State Id, or passport. All
applicable fees need to be paid at the time of
release.
Company or Trust owned Vehicles:
The
individual requesting the release of the vehicle
must submit a legal document with the company
name or trust name and individual's name on the
document showing that they urc connected to the
company or Trust and have the right to have the
vehicle released to them. Driver's license, State
Id or passpon will also be required for
identification. All fees have lo be paid prior to
releasing.

•

•

•
•

Impound Lot Personnel
•

•

•

Note: Insurance agents muy only inspect vel,icles,
not remove property from then1.

An Impound Lot Inspection and Property Release
fonn must be presented lo the impound lot personnel
to gain access to a vehicle stored in the lot.

•

Issuing Impound Lot Inspection and Property
Release Forms

•

o

o

A separate Impound Lot Inspection and Property
Release limn must be issued for each vehicle,
each time it is inspected or searched.
(Exception: The Auto Theft Sergeant may use
one form Lo gain access to the lot for the purpose
of verifying vehicle identification numbers on
several cars.)
Vehicles with Holds: Detectives from this
Department or DEA Metro, may authorize the
release of itemized property using the Impound
Lot Inspection and Property Release Forms.

Vehicles without I folds:
SLCPD Officers,
officers from outside agencies, vehicle owners
and any other person authorized by this policy
may obtain authori7.ation forms via the Service
Desk or the Impound Coordinator.
Before issuing a form, any Hold on the vehicle
must be cleared through the follow-up officer or
the follow-up officer's supervisor. Officers from
this Department or DEA Metro should give
vehicle ov.ners, officers, agents or other
representatives specific instruction for clearing
Holds.
After hours, emergency property releases may be
authorized by the on-duly Watch Commander.
Property which may be authorized for release
shall be limited to the personal property
contained within the vehicle, but not attached to
the vehicle or considered to be part of the
vehicle's equipment (i.e. stereos, wheels, etc.).

Only persons with a valid Impound Lot
Inspection and Property Release fonn will be
given access to impounded vehicles.
The impound lot auendant should, whenever
possible, accompany the requesting party during
inspection of the vehicle.
Property removed from a vehicle must be
verified against the Impound Lot Inspection and
Property Release form. The vehicle owner or
representative may only retrieve items itemized
on the release form unless the release is for
personal property and the Impound Lot
personnel will list the items removed on the
fom1. The Impound lot person will have the
person receiving the property verify the accuracy
of the property list.
Officers removing additional property must
itemize the property and its disposition on the
fonn.

The impound lot attendant will retain the original
copy of the form and return the yellow copy to
the Impound Coordinator.
The Impound
Coordinator will attach the yellow copy to the
case to be filed for 3 years.

Officers Removing Property: Officers removing
property for evidence must observe accepted search
and seizure practices. Any evidence removed must
be described
in additional narrative and
pmpcrty/cvidence entry.

Vehicle Relocations
Relocations are a courtesy to the vehicle owner.
Illegally parked vehicles should be dealt with
according to State law or City ordinance and
Department policy regarding impounds. In some
circumstances, it may be appropriate for an officer lo
have a legally parked, unattended vehicle relocated to
another parking place.
Officers may arrange for the relocation of vehicles at
the request of other City departments. 'Officers will
explain to those representatives from other City
departments that the relocation will be at the expense
of that department. Vehicles will be relocated to the
nearest legal parking place as the situation dictates.
Only those towing companies specified by
contractual agreement with the City will be used to
relocate vehicles.
Officers will notify Dispatch of the description,
license plate and the location of the relocated vehicle
and the reason for relocating the vehicle. This
infonnation will be documented in the RMS.

